If the history of philosophy could be told without gaps, where and how would Indian philosophy fi t in? And, when all is said and done, what are some of the arguments and positions that could be recruited to advance contemporary debates in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, philosophy of language, ethics, metaethics, moral psychology, political philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion? Introductions to Indian philosophy seldom engage these questions. Instead, they proceed to offer prospective readers an appreciation of the richness and real depth of the Indian philosophical tradition in its own terms, and of the intellectual rewards that stand to be gained by delving into it. In this sense, introductions to Indian philosophy differ from introductions to Western philosophy in one signifi cant way: the latter typically lack such incentives, given the widespread assumption (some might say, prejudice) that Western philosophers have shaped not only the way people in the West think about the world today but, in the wake of colonialism, people across the planet. If the study of Indian philosophy, then, is to have scope beyond the confi nes of intellectual history, questions about its own claims and aspirations to truth cannot be ignored. Indeed, such questions concern the ongoing relevance of its rich repertoire of methods, views, and arguments, and not simply their preservation value.
the conceptual terrain of a primarily, but by no means exclusively, Sanskritic philosophical culture of similar ancestry and equal breadth and depth to that of China, Greece, and the Latin West. The present introduction concerns the place that this vast body of literature should occupy in the history of philosophy, and the challenge of championing pre-modern modes of inquiry in an era when philosophy, at least in the anglophone world and its satellites, has in large measure become a highly specialized and technical discipline conceived on the model of the sciences. This challenge is particularly acute when philosophical fi gures and texts that are historically and culturally distant from us are engaged not only exegetically but also with a view to recruiting their topics and arguments for contemporary philosophical debates.
Canon, style, and the question of method
One way to address the questions raised here is to consider the current standard philosophy curriculum. When students in Kolkata, Hong Kong, and Tokyo are introduced to philosophy in philosophy programs, for the most part they end up reading some of the same fi gures and works that students in Oxford, Berlin, and New York do: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, John Stuart Mill, and their infl uential twentieth-and twenty-fi rst-century descendants. But in Kolkata a student might also get exposure to the works of V ā tsy ā yana, Gan ̇ ges % a, and Ragun ā tha Ś iroman ̣ i, and wonder how their contributions to, say, epistemic norms or category theory fi t in with contemporary debates in epistemology and philosophy of language. Likewise, students in Tokyo and Hong Kong might get to read D ō gen and Mozi, and ponder the historical roots of paraconsistent logic and rule consequentialism. On the whole, whether it is read in Oxford or in Kolkata, philosophy's Western bias holds sway, which explains why calls for expanding the canon to accommodate important sources of philosophical skill from other cultures have been largely unsuccessful. Cultural chauvinism and a devaluation of indigenous knowledge sources are partly to blame. But what looms large in the imagination of the great majority of philosophers trained on a predominantly Western curriculum, whether in Kolkata or Oxford, is the issue of incommensurability.
When we see the history of philosophy as a series of dialogues among philosophers pursuing unresolved problems by building on the achievements of their acknowledged forbears we can understand why voices that are not part of the received canon are hard to fi t in. Philosophy -the story goes -is constrained by its own genealogy. Consider the student who learns in an epistemology seminar that Gan ̇ ges % a, a fourteenth-century philosopher from Mithil ā and founder of the so-called 'new reason' (Navya-Ny ā ya) school, is the author of an infl uential non-semantic theory of truth. By making truth statements dependent on the actual occurrence of cognitive events, Gan ̇ ges % a is able to block such paradoxical statements as the antinomy of the liar (e.g., Epimenides' paradox) that would be commonplace on, say, a Tarski-inspired, semantic conception of truth.
1
But to account for Gan ̇ ges % a's philosophical contribution our student would have to get acquainted with pram ā n ̣ a -theory -that is, the theory of the means or sources of knowledge -and with a centuries-old debate about whether truth is apprehended 5 intrinsically ( svatah ̣ ) or dependent on extraneous conditions ( paratah ̣ ), and the implications of these positions (and their variants) for self-knowledge, testimony, and the grounds of certainty.
Making sense of Gan ̇ ges % a's theory of truth by gaining a measure of familiarity with his own Ny ā ya, M ī m ā m s ā , and Buddhist interlocutors, then, is a necessary step. But it is by no means suffi cient. One must also become acquainted with the distinctive features of the Indian philosophical genre. There are four categories of writing that stand out: (i) terse formulaic assertions ( s ū tra ), of an aphorism-like quality, (ii) basic commentary ( bh ā s ̣ ya ), aimed at unpacking the elusive assertions, (iii) main subcommentary ( v ā rttika ), extending the scope of various positions within the commentary usually by way of revision, and further (iv) subcommentarial additions ( nibandha ), which continue the process of interrogation and revision until all interpretive and argumentative possibilities have been exhausted. Some subcommentaries are limited in scope either to clarifying the syntax of the text and providing more clear alternatives (the vr tti and vivaran ̣ a ) or to elucidating obscure terms (the t ī k ā ).
Furthermore, the commentarial genre comprises a distinct set of nested statements that begins with 'the topic' ( vis ̣ aya ) of discussion, followed by the expression 'of a doubt' ( sam s % aya ), the citing 'of an opponent's position' ( p ū rvapaks ̣ a ), an affirmation 'of the decided view' ( siddh ā nta ), and ending with a statement 'of purpose' ( prayojana ). Lastly, there are several types of relations that obtain among the sections of a given commentarial text, all of which aim to ensure some form of dialogical unity. A successive section should either serve as a corollary ( prasan ̇ ga ) or as a prerequisite ( upodgh ā ta ) to a prior section, either exhibit causal dependence ( hetutva ) on the former or eliminate some potential obstacle ( avasara ), and either share a common goal ( nirv ā hakaikya ) or act as the causal condition ( k ā ryaikya ) of a common outcome. Beyond these structural features there are conceptual rules to ensure that proper channels of belief acquisition are followed, and that beliefs are produced in the right way. And last, but not least, it is paramount that fallacies ( hetv ā bh ā sa ) of reasoning are carefully identified and avoided.
This cursory acquaintance with the discursive strategies of the commentarial genre may signal analytic rigor or a pedantic scholasticism. Either way, it would seem obvious that engaging Indian philosophy without sharing some of its own presuppositions and concerns about the nature of evidence, the proper place of reason, and the aims of inquiry, is a remote possibility at best.
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Most important, the contemporary reader looking for the Indian equivalent of a Descartes, Hume, or Kant (or, closer to the present age, of a Husserl, Sartre, or Quine) would need to suspend belief about style and method and proceed with caution so as not to let assumptions about the 'natural' order of events get in the way. In India, concerns with the justifi cation of true belief occupied thinkers long before it became fashionable in twentieth-century analytic philosophy with Gettier. And debates about consciousness, intentionality, and self-knowledge fl ourished during the exact same period -the second half of the fi rst millenniumwhen philosophy in the West went into progressive decline after the closing of Plato's Academy in 529 CE. 
Shifting attitudes toward doctrine
The new spirit of rational and scientifi c inquiry that we associate in the West with Descartes and the British empiricists may be absent in India prior to the advent of British colonial rule in the nineteenth century.
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But methodical reasoning of an unprecedented degree of sophistications and technicality, as the Navya Ny ā ya literature attests, is part of the course. While for the most part still motivated by the need to explain and justify scholastic positions, a new attitude of critical deference to (if not yet distance from) authority, heralds the arrival of a proto-modernity. This new attitude is born of the progressive recognition, fi rst, that beliefs justifi ed without any extra-textual evidence -as traditions of thought indebted to the M ī m ā m s ā had considered -could be fallible and, second, that causal explanation often trumps appeals to textual coherence and doctrinal consistency.
The roots of this new attitude reach deep into the latter part of fi rst millennium. Indeed, from Dharmottara (eighth century) and Ratnak ī rti (eleventh century) to Gan ̇ ges % a (fourteenth century) and Raghun ā tha (sixteenth century), Indian philosophers engaged in lengthy debates about such epistemic notions as 'defect' ( dos ̣ a ) and 'excellence' ( gun ̣ a ). While recognizing the potential fallibility of belief they also noted that veridical cognitions could not be based solely on beliefs one held intrinsically. However, not all traditions of thought embraced this attitude of critical deference. But those that did -primarily the 'new reason' thinkers following in the footsteps of Gan ̇ ges % a -ended up scrutinizing more carefully the nature and sources of belief formation. Rather than placing the burden of epistemic responsibility on the belief itself (and how it is held), these 'new reason' thinkers gradually shifted the focus to its sources: to how we come to form beliefs in the fi rst place. For instance, they reasoned that if it could be understood that mirrors function the way that they do because of their refl ective properties, then the belief that mirrors possess the object refl ected, however mysterious these properties might turn out to be, could no longer be justifi ed. If epistemic reliability is a factor of descriptive accuracy, then the view that there are such things as brute common-sense facts becomes untenable.
It is hard to assess how widespread this new attitude toward the scope and aims of philosophical inquiry became in pre-colonial India, and several chapters in this volume seek to tackle this question. What is certain is that a great deal of Indian philosophy, even when directly concerned with the justifi cation of textual, testimonial, or experiential issues, is still permeated by tradition-specifi c doctrinal assumptions (some of which hinge on the precise number and nature of reliable sources of belief formation ( pram ā n ̣ a ), while others on whether constructive philosophical debate requires any such doxastic practices at all). Most emblematic of this hermeneutical approach are M ī m ā m saka thinkers such as Kum ā rila and Prabh ā kara (seventh to eighth century), whose primary concern is the interpretation of the Vedas and the justifi cation for the observance of Vedic ritual. Kum ā rila in particular is best known for granting that language has an inexhaustible and unmatched capacity for expression, and for defending a view of the Vedas as repositories of epistemically warranted statements. To claim that cognitions formed on the basis of such statements are inherently justifi ed, argues Kum ā rila, is to say that they are the bearers of language's own self-expressive and self-revealing power. Doctrinal assumptions are also at the heart of more robustly metaphysical systems of thought concerned with the nature of ultimate reality and the self. When R ā m ā nujaan infl uential twelfth-century philosopher of religion and founder of a qualifi ed nondualist school of thought -claims that Advaita (e.g., 'nondual' or lacking in any attributes) conceptions of Brahman are logically incoherent, he appeals to the intuitions of the Sanskrit grammarians about the category of 'being' or 'existence' ( sattva ). For the grammarians, sattva serves by defi nition as the locus of generic properties, qualities, and actions. Likewise, when Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta (tenth to eleventh century) -proponents of a nondualist, but theist, metaphysical system within the Kashmir Ś aiva tradition -put forward a quasi-Sartrean conception of the self as the pure and unhindered freedom ( sv ā tantrya ) of consciousness, they are responding to Buddhist epistemological efforts, championed by Dharmak ī rti (seventh century) and his followers, to reconcile a conception of consciousness as inherently self-revealing with the cardinal Buddhist doctrines of momentariness and no-self.
Confronting the metaphilosophical question
As it should be obvious by now, Indian philosophy has its own genealogy and its own rich repertoire of intramural debates. The responsible approach, at least according to the historian of philosophy, would be to chart its course without constant reference to periods and categories in Western philosophy or, worse, outmoded (although still popular) Orientalist conceptions of Indian thought as dominated by religious and spiritual concerns, and, hence, as not really philosophy by the standards of contemporary anglophone philosophy. But the historical approach ignores pragmatic considerations about what, in the absence of cultural affi nities, should motivate the study of Indian philosophy outside its traditional sphere of infl uence, that is, outside the gurukula system and India's modern secular universities. After all, acknowledging the presence of important sources of philosophical insight in the Indian tradition is not enough to motivate contemporary philosophers to engage it, let alone take up the study of Sanskrit.
Whether we are dealing with claims about language, reality, and the self, or with principles of reason and empirical grounding, pragmatic exigencies demand that Indian philosophical views face the same sort of scrutiny as all other presuppositions of the genre. Indeed, from a metaphilosophical standpoint -that is, from the standpoint of inquiry into the nature of philosophy -the question "Is the Indian philosophical genre philosophy ?" is a perfectly legitimate way to seek clarity about what should count as philosophy. 4 But the metaphilosophical question cannot be countenanced, if suffi cient care to avoid any one conception of its nature and scope from defi ning the genre as a whole has not been taken. Philosophy may well be emblematic of the human quest to "understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term But that understanding has already been shaped by a long history of such enduring attempts. And yet, answering the metaphilosophical question requires that we bracket historical considerations altogether and eschew their normative challenges. Are the moral and metaphysical lessons of the Upanis ̣ ads , the Yoga-s ū tras , and the Bhagavad-G ī t ā philosophy , in the critical sense in which that practice has been retrospectively interpreted and adopted in both fourteenth-century India and eighteenth-century Europe? Maybe that is the wrong question. Perhaps we should reconsider, with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Pierre Hadot, and Martha Nussbaum, whether it would not be more appropriate to ask what specifi c forms of life these texts promote, rather than how philosophical the seemingly insoluble problems they give rise to are. 
Indigenism, comparison, and the cosmopolitan ideal
In so far as philosophy in English or the Anglophone culture at large defi nes itself against the backdrop of a distinct community of inquiry -nowadays constituted largely of professional philosophers -the question whether the Indian philosophical genre qualifi es as philosophy cannot be answered without engaging in the type of intellectual exercise known as 'comparative philosophy'. As Bimal Krishna Matilal observed some time ago, anyone who seeks "to explain and translate systematically from Indian philosophical writings into a European language will, knowingly or unknowingly, be using the method of 'comparative philosophy'." Not only explicit attempts to bring Indian and Western philosophers in dialogue, but even text-critical approaches to the genre fall under this category. Doing Indian philosophy in English also means operating with a conceptual vocabulary shaped by the Greek culture of fi rst millennium BCE, the scholasticism of the Latin Middle Ages, and the predominantly French, English, and German intellectual movements of early modern Europe. Thus, one cannot do Indian philosophy without at the same time doing Western philosophy, which means that questions about whether the tenets of one tradition can sustain statement in the other become paramount. Practitioners of the genre 'comparative philosophy' are no strangers to expressing misgivings about comparisons that merely tag theories bearing certain resemblances. And skeptics who champion various forms of indigenism have gone as far as to argue that the adoption of English as a medium for doing Indian philosophy has been profoundly alienating, despite invaluable contributions from such infl uential early modern Indian philosophers as Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, Surendranath Dasgupta, Mysore Hiriyana, and Anukul Chandra Mukherji. 8 Refl ecting on this practice as a philosopher trained in both the Indian and the Western, primarily phenomenological, tradition, Jitendranath Mohanty singled out the mutually enhancing value of thinking across cultural boundaries, and the promise that such enterprise might one day usher a new kind of philosophy that is global in scope and outlook. new nor particularly revolutionary. When Dign ā ga ( c. fi fth to sixth century) embarks on his synthesis of the prevalent epistemological, grammatical, and psychological theories of his day and V ā caspati Mis % ra (tenth century) authors his empathetic and infl uential commentaries on Advaita Ved ā nta, Ny ā ya, and S ā m khya-Yoga texts, they do so as members of a Sanskrit cosmopolis.
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That cosmopolis endures today among traditionally trained scholars in India and the Indian diaspora. But it functions within, and relative to, an all-encompassing and universalizing cosmopolis that we now call the global West. Doing Indian philosophy today means operating within a larger horizon whose cardinal points of reference are no longer geographical but for the most part conceptual and institutional. Academic philosophy in the global West is a cosmopolitan phenomenon that mirrors the progress of the sciences in its open-ended practice of asking questions and pursuing knowledge. 12 If one cannot do Indian philosophy in English without doing comparative philosophy, the question naturally arises: is comparative philosophy philosophy ? The cosmopolitan approach is partly motivated by a deep skepticism about the possibility of doing philosophy comparatively. If comparative religion is not religion and comparative politics is not politics, how is comparative philosophy philosophy ? Answers to this question run the gamut from outright rejection of the possibility of meaningful comparisons, because of the incommensurability of Indian and Western traditions, to the view that the content of these traditions, save for minor stylistic differences, is practically the same. Skeptics point out that while doctrinal and spiritual concerns are not uncommon for Western fi gures like Augustine, Aquinas, and Kierkegaard, they are not representative of the dominant ideals of discursive rationality and argumentation that Western philosophy has inherited from the Greeks. Brushing aside such superfi cial dismissals, defenders argue that the most infl uential Indian philosophers (e.g., N ā g ā rjuna, Dharmak ī rti, Kum ā rila, Ś r ī hars ̣ a, and Gan ̇ ges % a, among others) show as much penchant for rational deliberation and argumentative rigor as Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein.
Philosophical interventions at the confl uence of cultures
So, then: how is comparative philosophy philosophy ? Pursuing a similar line of inquiry, Arindam Chakrabarti and Ralph Weber give an example of the sort of interventions in solving long-standing philosophical debates in both India and the West that only comparative philosophy is equipped to handle. 13 Take refl exivismthe thesis that consciousness consists in conscious mental states being implicitly self-aware. In India a group of mainly Buddhist philosophers beginning with Dign ā ga and Dharmak ī rti have defended versions of this thesis against Naiy ā yikas, who claimed instead that the self-awareness which accompanies each instance of cognition is inferred from the effects of that cognition. Where the refl exivist thinks that I can know something only to the extent that each instance of cognition is inherently self-revealing or self-illuminating, his opponent counters that such cognitive acts as 'seeing something' are transparent with regard to their own operations. If knowing is an act, we are only aware of it indirectly, when refl ection turns within and toward its own operations. We see the tree outside the window, not the seeing of that tree. But we can infer that seeing has occurred for someone from the tree that is now seen. And yet, to postulate a basis for self-knowledge outside the structure of experience, or to locate it solely in the conceptual realm, is to problematically assume that experience is an emergent property of something that is not itself experiential.
Readers familiar with contemporary debates in phenomenology and philosophy of mind would immediately recognize these positions as versions of conceptualism versus non-conceptualism with regard to perceptual content, and of the Higher-Order versus First-Order theories of consciousness. Such recognition opens the possibility of intervention, either from the direction of Indian philosophy or, in this particular case, from that of contemporary philosophy of mind, in solving long-standing debates in each tradition. Examples of such interventions abound in the comparative and cross-cultural philosophical literature, often yielding novel ways of tackling long-standing problems. Sometimes they also provide effective platforms from which to interrogate Western hegemonic forms of language, thought, and morality, and take to task those infl uential philosophers -with Nietzsche as the prototypical example -most responsible for perpetrating a sort of 'neglect by appropriation' approach to Indian philosophy. 14 On this 'interventionist' model comparative philosophy is philosophy -in the sense of an open-ended concern with asking questions and pursuing knowledge. But is it the sort of philosophy that showcases, if not the unique features, at least the unique trajectory of Indian philosophy?
One worry is that such interventions end up treating Indian philosophy as a sort of standing reserve to be mined for interesting or even original statements, with utter disregard for their historical context and signifi cance. We only need look at such "manuals of reason" as Moks ̣ ā karagupta's Tarkabh ā s ̣ ā (twelfth century) and Annambhat t a's Tarkasam graha (seventeenth century) to realize that these worries are misplaced. What is distinctive about these indigenous interventions is precisely their systematic effort to identify, analyze, and evaluate the basic tenets of each school, often disregarding context or attribution, with the aid of various epistemological, methodological, and logical techniques.
An altogether different sort of worry is that many such interventions are anachronistic. Take the example of cutting across historical and cultural boundaries to make the case that, say, the twelfth-century Advaitin Ś r ī hars ̣ a rather than Gettier should be credited with the Gettier Problem. But a history of philosophy without gaps will have to look beyond linear narratives and realize that such juxtapositions are inevitable if we are to do justice to the progression of thought. If Ś r ī hars ̣ a is the fi rst to frame and illustrate the (Gettier) problem, and the fi rst to venture interesting solutions, then he addresses not only the concerns of his twelve-century Naiy ā yika opponents, but also those of late twentieth-century analytic epistemology.
I have already hinted that chronologies are relative to a given philosophical culture and epoch. If 'classical' is an apt term for much of the early period of Indian philosophy, 'mediaeval' is not. There is no break with the past in India similar to the onset of the European Middle Ages. Foundational s ū tras for the S ā m khya, Yoga, Buddhist, Jaina, C ā rv ā ka, Ny ā ya, Vais % es ̣ ika, M ī m ā m s ā , and Vedanta traditions are continuously composed over several centuries beginning around 500 BCE, and the commentarial tradition continues well into the middle of the second millennium of the Common Era. 15 Apart from these worries there is also the objection that this sort of cosmopolitan intervention either ignores or glosses over issues of cultural difference and conceptual incommensurability. Indian philosophy is host to conceptual, argumentative, and experiential strategies that do not map neatly onto Western categories and practices. Render classical Indian logic in Western terms, and the anum ā na system of inference ends up being indistinguishable from the Aristotelian syllogism. Retain the original format with its distinctive steps and characteristics, and the Indian tradition of debate can seem alien and contrived. One response to this objection is predictably straightforward: whether one thinks inside or outside the categorical framework of a particular philosophical tradition or culture, 16 one need not endorse its conceptual schema. M ā dhyamika philosophers make good use of the sophisticated categorical frameworks of Abhidharma, Ny ā ya, and the Sanskrit grammarians, and yet treat them as 'worldly conventions' ( lokasam vr iti ) that do not capture the way things are ultimately. For M ā dhyamikas, just as for many contemporary global antirealists, seeking to capture the intrinsic order of reality through a categorical framework (be it that of Vais % es ̣ ika or Aristotle) has to contend with the very notion of an 'essence' or 'intrinsic order' of things. Effective as they may be, such categories are subject to revision. And, if it should turn out that there are better ways of knowing and being, it is hard to see how pursuing them would not be preferable to the status quo.
Sometimes the best way to make progress is not to start anew, by breaking with the past, but to consider an alternative course, specifi cally one that philosophy might have taken had it been shaped by a different cultural geography. In the West philosophy begins in wonder about the natural world and the reach of reason; in India, by contrast, it begins in speculations about the origins, nature, and function of language as a vehicle of philosophical insight. While the Pre-Socratics wonder about the ultimate principle of things ( arche ) using the vocabulary of nature, Indian philosophers beginning with Jaimini (fourth century BCE), Gautama (second century CE), and N ā g ā rjuna ( fl . second century CE) are concerned with fi nding out what the relation between words and their referents is ultimately like. Is it a primordial ( autpattika ) relation, as Jaimini claims? Does it depend on a certain capacity to generate knowledge that awareness-episodes ( pram ā ) have, as Gautama stipulates? Or is this relation simply the result of an illegitimate metaphysical use of language prone to reifi cation, as N ā g ā rjuna would have it? As should be obvious to all readers of Cratylus , such concerns are by no means unique to the Indian philosophical tradition. But in India they contribute to the articulation of a sophisticated philosophy of language that does not become the norm in the West until the middle of the eighteenth century.
If the study of Indian philosophy is to resist retreat into the familiar terrain of tradition and its scholastic proclivities, perhaps a confl uence of perspectives rather than their comparison is more methodologically apt. Such confl uence is not without historical precedent. Contact between India and the Greek world following Alexander the Great's military campaigns set the stage for a work of Buddhist apologetics (the Milinda Pañha ), and allowed such attitudes as 'freedom from emotion' ( apatheia ) and 'contentedness' ( eukolia ) -which Pyrrho is said to have witnessed among the so-called 'naked wise men' ( gymnosophists ) of India -to inform Hellenistic skepticism. The cosmopolitan oasis towns of Bukhara, Samarkand, Kashgar, Khotan, and Kucha served as a land bridge between Indian Buddhists and Chinese intellectuals drawn to the philosophy of emptiness. Their encounter resulted in a practice of matching Buddhist and Daoist concepts ( ko-i fo-chiao ) that, by the fourth century CE, would render core Mah ā y ā na Buddhist ideas indistinguishable from the teachings of Daodejing and Zhuangzi . And, the more tolerant sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Mughal rules of Akbar and Shah Jahan made possible D ā r ā Shukoh's momentous translation project of the Upanis ̣ ads, exposing Persian and Arabic intelligentsia to the same Sanskrit philosophical lore that a century and a half later would end up, via translations from Persian to Latin, on Schopenhauer's desk.
Signifi cant as these confl uences are we must not forget that they tell as much of a story of admiration as of appropriation, assimilation, and refutation. For the anonymous compilers of Milinda Pañha ('Questions of Milinda'), the Greek philosopher-king Milinda (Menander I) is simply a foil for N ā gasena's compelling defense of the Buddhist no-self view. Pyrrho, to the extent that we can reconstruct his views, mainly engages with Democritus, Plato, and the Eleatics. And Schopenhauer's main interlocutor is Kant rather than Y ā jñavalkya, despite his high regard for the Upanis ̣ ads.
As we look to the future of philosophy in the twenty-fi rst century we can only hope that a better knowledge of Indian philosophy would result in many and more fruitful conversations about knowledge, being, and what there is, and about the proper place of reason in the midst of it all.
Notes
1 See Mohanty ( 1966 ), Matilal ( 1985 , and Phillips ( 2012 : 87-91) for detailed treatments of Gan ̇ ges % a's theories of truth that also engage contemporary issues in epistemology. 2 As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2012 : 279) , the most important aspect of this intercultural philosophical engagement is not the recognition that there are different approaches to philosophy, but the promise that such recognition holds for enhancing, refi ning, and expanding the range of argument and possibilities that are available to us. 3 Ganeri ( 2012 : 6) argues otherwise, but see Garfi eld ( 2014 ) and Phillips ( 2016 ) for more skeptical views about whether the outlook of 'new reason' Naiy ā yika like Raghun ā tha is of a piece with that of early modern thinkers in Europe. 4 Perrett ( 2016 : 3) , rightly in my view, notes that as exasperating as this question can be for Indologists and historians of Indian philosophy, is it perfectly legitimate if we are to distinguish between 'descriptive' and 'evaluative' (or 'normative') uses of the term 'philosophy'. By the same token one could ask the question: "Is this creative form art ?" or "Is this writing literature ?" and conclude that while something does descriptively fall under the category 'art' or 'literature,' it may still not belong to the class of good art or literature. 5 Sellars ( 1962 : 1) . 6 See Wittgenstein ( 2001 : 192) , Hadot ( 2001 : ch. 1), and Nussbaum ( 1994 : 14) .
